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Leading Articles
CONFLICTS BETWEEN ZONING ORDINANCES
AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS:
A PROBLEM IN LAND USE POLICY
Lawrence Berger*
It is a commonplace to note that with an ever-increasing birth
rate and decreasing death rate, as well as concomitant increases
in demand for food, fiber, mineral resources, and space, effective
land use control is a most important problem in our society. The
problem is exacerbated by accompanying shifts in population concentrations-first from rural to urban and then from urban to suburban communities. Under our system these problems are handled
at least partly (but not wholly) by resort to legal devices. The
law has developed three categories of such devices for land use
control: (1) those arrived at by consensual arrangements of the
landowners, the covenant and the related equitable servitude;1
(2) those arising from common law doctrines of private liability,
the nuisance; and (3) those arising from direct governmental regulatory controls over land use, the zoning and allied laws.2
The rules of law relating to the first two categories are the
result of the evolution of hundreds of years of case controversy
and decision. Zoning and allied laws are a more recent development
and in a short amount of time have become an almost universally
utilized vehicle for handling municipal land use problems. 3
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. The author would
like to express his gratitude for Professor Wallace Rudolph's many suggestions concerning this article.
1 "[R]estrictions under deeds and contracts and those under zoning or-

dinances do not have common purposes. The former have private ends
in view, and although they may in some instances be directed to secure

the public welfare or the good of a residential or other property de-

velopment, they are, nevertheless, privately conceived, controlled and

directed." Premium Point Park Ass'n v. Polar Bear, Inc., 121 N.Y.S.2d
596, 601 (Sup. Ct. 1953), rev'd, 282 App. Div. 735, 122 N.Y.S'2d 425 (2d

Dep't 1953), modified, 306 N.Y. 507, 119 N.E.2d 360 (1954). See also 8
McQnmLiN, MumciPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.09 (3d ed. 1957).
ther direct controls which are sometimes categorized as zoning and
sometimes separately categorized are subdivision controls, building codes
and inspection, sanitary codes, tenement house codes and set-back
ordinances. See METZEBAUM, ZoNINa ch. 1 (2d ed. 1955).
3 See HAAR, LAND USE PLANNIm ch. 3 (1959).
2

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 43, NO. 3
Occasionally over the years there have been collisions between
the different devices. In such cases, there are obviously involved
clashes between private land use arrangements and the public will
as expressed by the city or state. Such collisions pose most serious
problems in constitutional and statutory interpretation and judgemade law formulation. Should there be a rule superimposing
public will over private arrangement? What factors should the
court consider in determining which device and under what limitations that device shall prevail? In this article, an endeavor will be
made to explore one highly litigated set of these conflicts-that
between restrictive convenants and zoning ordinances. First, the
present governing law will be examined. Then an attempt will
be made to formulate some general principles which should govern
adjudications in the area.
4
THE PRESENT LAW ON ZONING VS. COVENANTS

It is a simple matter to state what the vast and overwhelming
mass of cases have held when there has been found to be a conflict
between a restrictive covenant and a zoning ordinance. These
cases almost invariably involve a suit to enjoin acts constituting a
violation of a restrictive covenant, which acts a subsequent zoning
ordinance purports to make a proper use. The courts have generally
stated that in such case the restrictive covenant cannot be abrogated
by the ordinance. 5 Most have just announced the rule with little
or no statement of reasons or analysis of the problem. The following
language is typical: "A valid restriction on the use of realty is

4

In general on this subject, see 2
(3d ed. 1962); 2 METZENBAUM,

5

Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 343 P.2d 959 (1959); Arlington

RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING ch. 74
ZONING ch. Xd (2d ed. 1955); 8 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL COPORATONS § 25.09 (3d ed. 1957); Van Hecke,
Zoning Ordinances and Restrictions in Deeds, 37 YALE L.J. 407 (1928);

Comment, 48 MICH. L. REV. 103 (1949).

Cemetery Corp. v. Hoffman, 216 Ga. 735, 119 S.E.2d 696 (1961); Dolan v.
Brown, 338 Ill. 412, 170 N.E. 425 (1930); Burgess v. Magarian, 214 Iowa
694, 243 N.W. 356 (1932); Jenney v. Hynes, 282 Mass. 182, 184 N.E. 444

(1933); Morgan v. Matheson, 362 Mich. 535, 107 N.W.2d 825 (1961);
Scillia v. Szalai, 142 N.J. Eq. 92, 59 A.2d 435 (Ch. 1948); Rich v. West,
34 Misc. 2d 1002, 228 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Lefferts Manor Ass'n
v. Fass, 28 Misc. 2d 1005, 211 N.Y.S.2d 18 (Sup. Ct. 1960), appeal dismissed,
13 App. Div. 2d 812, 217 N.Y.S.2d 531 (2d Dep't 1961); Myers v. Smith,
112 Ohio App. 169, 171 N.E.2d 744 (1960), appeal dismissed, 171 Ohio St.
292, 170 N.E.2d 71 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961); Frey v.

Poynor, 369 P.2d 168 (Okla. 1962); Hysinger v. Mullinax, 204 Tenn. 181,
319 S.W.2d 79 (1958); Spencer v. Maverick, 146 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941).
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neither nullified nor superseded by the adoption of a zoning ordinance, nor is the validity of the restriction thereby affected.""
Some of the earlier cases rested the rule on vaguely stated
constitutional grounds7 For example, in Ludgate v. Somerville8
the court said in holding the ordinance ineffective: 9
An act which so deprives a citizen of his property rights cannot
be sustained under the police power unless the public health,
comfort, or welfare demands such enactment. It cannot well be
argued that the purpose to enjoy that which we are pleased to call
home and to protect it against the encroachment of commercial
interests is inimical to public welfare.
A few courts, though following the general rule, admit evidence
of the zoning ordinance in order to show that there has been a
neighborhood change. 0 This in turn constitutes grounds for refusal to enforce the covenant.
In at least three cases the courts have said that the more
restrictive of the two land use controls governs." One court limited
its holding that the covenant controls to a situation where there is
2
a prior covenant followed by an inconsistent zoning ordinance.
And, the New Jersey courts have ruled that when the municipality
itself is the covenantee, it can pass an ordinance inconsistent with
the covenant thereby waiving the benefit of the covenant owned
by the city.' 3
One difficulty with formulating rules for this area lies in the
fact that the courts have been faced primarily, if not exclusively,
with the problem of a prior covenant restricting the property to
6Hirsch v. Hancock, 173 Cal. App. 2d 745, 756, 343 P.2d 959, 966 (1959).
7
Vorenberg v. Bunnell, 257 Mass. 399, 153 N.E. 884, (1926); Ludgate v.
Somerville, 121 Ore. 643, 256 Pac. 1043 (1927).
8 121 Ore. 643, 647, 256 Pac. 1043, 1045 (1927).
9Id. at 647, 256 Pac. at 1045.
10 Bard v. Rose, 203 Cal. App. 2d 232, 21 Cal. Rptr. 382 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962); Wolff v. Fallon, 44 Cal. 2d 695, 284 P.2d 802 (1955); Wahrendorff v. Moore, 93 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1957); Goodwin Bros. v. Combs Lumber Co., 275 Ky. 114, 120 S.W.2d 1024 (1938); Shuford v. Asheville Oil
Co., 243 N.C. 636, 91 S.E.2d 903 (1956); Hill v. Ogrodnik, 83 R.I. 138, 113
A.2d 734 (1955).
"1Bluett v. County of Cook, 19 Ill. App. 2d 172, 153 N.E.2d 305 (1958);
City of Richiawn v. McMakin, 313 Ky. 265, 230 S.W.2d 902 (1950);
Szilvasy v. Saviers, 70 Ohio App. 34, 44 N.E.2d 732 (1942).
12Morton v. Sayles, 304 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
13 Taylor v. City of Hackensack, 137 N.J.L. 139, 58 A.2d 788 (Sup. Ct.
1948), aff'd, 1 N.J. 211, 62 A.2d 686 (1948); Hendlin v. Fairmount Constr. Co., 8 N.J. Super. 310, 72 A.2d 541 (Ch. 1950).
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residence uses and a subsequent zoning ordinance allowing business uses. It would seem that with the growth of new techniques
in zoning such as noncumulative 4 and multi-use zoning, 15 the courts
are going to be faced with problems calling for more ingenuity and
imagination to reach sound results.
But the great hurdle in handling these problems is the fact that
courts have usually failed to give reasons for their rule that, in
general, ordinances cannot abrogate covenants. If the rule has
basis in law, it must rest on either the unconstitutionality of the
ordinance or the lack of municipal power to so regulate land use.
Conceivably, then, there are four possible bases: first, that the
ordinance has no reasonable relation to the public health, safety,
and welfare and therefore is a denial of substantive due process;
second, that the ordinance unconstitutionally impairs the obligation
of contract; third, that the ordinance constitutes a governmental
taking of property without just compensation; and fourth, that the
municipality is by ordinance attempting to alter private rights and
liabilities, something which it has no power to do. Before dealing
with the other policy questions raised by conflicts between ordinances and covenants, these constitutional and ultra vires questions
will be considered.
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
AND OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT
The substantive due process issue may be quickly settled. Even
ignoring the judicial disrepute in which the doctrine now reposes
federally, 6 substantive due process could threaten only individual
ordinances as applied to individual covenants. It could not be
applicable to all ordinances having the purported effect of abrogating covenants. 17 The question in each case rather would be whether
this particular ordinance which negates this particular covenant
bears a reasonable relationship to the public health, welfare and
safety. Substantive due process then could not be a justification

See note 56 infra.
15 See note 60 infra.
1OFerguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) seems to have rejected once
and for all substantive due process as a federal ground for invalidating
economic regulation.
17Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v.
City-of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). For the state cases, see 8
McQumin,
MuNiciPAL CoarPoRAONs § 25.60 n.61 (1957) and cases
therein cited.
14
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for a blanket rule holding all such ordinances void but would
occasionally be grounds for voiding an ordinance in a proper case.
There is only slightly more difficulty in disposing of the obligation of contracts issue. Although at one time the so-called contract
clause' was of substantial importance and was responsible for the
voiding of much state action, the period since the 1930's has seen
a marked decline in its significance, especially since the Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdefll" case. BlaisdelI involved a 1933
Minnesota statute which provided that mortgage foreclosures and
execution sales might be postponed for a reasonable time but not
beyond May 1, 1935. In holding that this was not an unconstitutional impairment of the obligation of contract, Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes justified his decision on two theories: (1) that the legislation was temporary and for emergency purposes only; and (2)
that all contracts are subject to a subsequent governmental exercise
of the police power. Later cases have relied on the second of these
as the exclusive ground for decision, 20 so that as a matter of federal
constitutional law it may be said that prior obligations of contract
may be impaired by an otherwise valid exercise of the police power.
It would seem there is little if anything left of the constitutional
provision that is not already encompassed in substantive due
process. 21 Similar developments may be noted in the cases involving analogous provisions of the'state constitutions. 22 Proper exercise of the police power is a justification for governmental impairment of contracts. There would thus be little argument under
present law that zoning, which is traditionally justified as a police
power measure, could not abrogate a prior covenant.

18 "No State shall ..,pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... ." U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
19 290 U.S. 398 (1933).
.2oVeix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940). See Hale,
The Supreme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HAzv. L. Ray. 512
(1944) and Note, 6 J. PuB. L. 250 (1957).
21 See CoRwiN, THE CONSTTUTION AND WHAT IT MEANs TODAY 82-83- (1954).
22

City of Chicago v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 4 Ill. 2d 307, 122 N.E.2d 553
(1954); Baxter v. Waterville Sewerage Dist., 146 Me. 211, 79 A.2d 585
(1951); City of Ecorse v. Peoples Community Hosp. Authority, 336 Mich.
490, 58 N.W.2d 159 (1953); Superior Oil Co. v. Foote, 214 Miss. 857, 59
So. 2d 85 (1952); City of Akron v. Public Util. Comm'n 149 Ohio St. 347,
78 N.E.2d 890 (1948). Contra, Garrett v. Colbert County Bd. of Educ.,
255 Ala. 86, 50 So. 2d 275 (1950).
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REQUIREMENT OF EMINENT DOMAIN
A third justification for the rule subordinating ordinances to
covenants might be that under the federal 23 and state constitutions,
private property may not be taken for public use without payment
of just compensation. The argument would be that the owner of
the dominant tenement of a restrictive covenant has a valuable
property right which cannot be taken away from him by a zoning
ordinance without provision for compensation.
Certainly this argument could not be applied where the ordinance was on the books prior to the creation of the covenant. Such
an agreement would be subject to existing law. But it would seem
to have some force where the ordinance purports to destroy a
previously created covenant. Indeed, there is a great deal of case
authority which states that where the state condemns property
for its own use it must compensate owners of tenements dominant
to the condemned property if the restrictive covenant24 owned by
the dominant tenant is breached by the condemnation.
The argument against requiring payment of compensation is
simply that zoning is traditionally viewed as an exercise of the
police power for which no payment of compensation is necessary.
Let us examine this premise. The hazy line between the police
power and eminent domain has been oft discussed. With relation
25
to this question it has been said:
Under the police power rights of property are impaired not be-

cause they become useful or necessary to the public, or because
23 The provision applicable to Federal takings is U.S. CONST. amend. V:
"... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."
24
Town of Stamford v. Vuono, 108 Conn. 359, 143 Atl. 245 (1928); Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chadwick, 228 Mass. 242, 117 N.E. 244 (1917);
Allen v. City of Detroit, 167 Mich. 464, 133 N.W. 317 (1911); Peters v.
Buckner, 288 Mo. 618, 232 S.W. 1024 (1921); Hayes v. Waverly & Passaic
R.R., 51 N.J. Eq. 345, 27 Atl. 648 (1893); Fuller v. Town Bd. of Town of
Madison, 193 Wis. 549, 214 N.W. 324 (1927). Contra, Board of Pub.
Instruction of Dade County v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 81 So. 2d
637 (Fla. 1955); City of Houston v. Wynne, 279 S.W. 916 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926). The arguments pro and con are summarized in 2 NIcHOLs, EMINENT DOM AN § 5.73 (1950). See also Note, 3 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 258 (1956);
NOTE,55 MICH. L. REV. 877 (1957); Comment, 53 MICH. L. REv. 451 (1955).
25
FREuND, POLICE POWER § 511 (1904). "There is much in American constitutional law to support this distinction although precise accuracy in
application is not required under the rule of deference to the legislative
judgment. Thus it has been held unconstitutional to compel an owner,
without compensation, to leave his land vacant in order to obtain the
advantages of open land for the public or in order to save the land for

ORDINANCES AND COVENANTS
some public advantage can be gained by disregarding them, but
because their free exercise is believed to be detrimental to public
interests; it may be said that the state takes property by eminent
domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police
power because it is harmful.
20
Many cases make essentially the same theoretical distinction.
But though this distinction may be well established and theoretically
sound, it can surely be said that many of the zoning cases have not
28
The decisions
followed it in substance 27 or indeed even in form.

future public purchase, but it is within constitutional power to compel
an owner to leave a portion of his land vacant where building would be
harmful to the use and enjoyment of other land (e.g., set-back lines).
It is unconstitutional to compel an owner to commit his land to park
use in order to meet the public desire for a park, but an owner may
be compelled to furnish a portion of his land for a park where the
need for a park results primarily from activity on other land of the
owner. It is unconstitutional to compel him to use his land as a parking
lot in order to obtain a parking lot for the community, but it is within
constitutional power to compel an owner to provide a parking lot for
the parking needs of activities on his own land. It is improper to
compel a railroad to install grade-crossings for highways in order to
promote the convenience of highway users, but it is permissible to
compel the railroad to install grade-crossings so as to eliminate danger
and hazards from the railroad's use of its own property. It is not permissible to compel an owner to hold land in reserve for industrial purposes by restricting his use to industrial purposes only, but it is permissible to exclude industrial development from districts where such
development will harm other uses in the district. It is beyond state power
to compel an owner without compensation to set aside or give land
to the public for a street or highway, but it is within that power to
compel him to do so where the need for the streets is related to the
traffic generated by the owner's use of his other land. Likewise the
state may compel an owner to furnish other community facilities such
as water and sewer lines at his own expense where the need for such
facilities results in part at least from activities on his other land."
Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoLum. L.
REv. 650, 666-67 (1958).
2
Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 408 (Ct. C1.
1955); Rose v. State of California, 19 Cal. 2d 713, 123 P.2d 505 (1942);
Podesta v. Linden Irrigation Dist., 141 Cal App. 2d 38, 296 P.2d 401
(Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Dudley v. Orange County, 137 So. 2d 859 (Dist.
Ct. App. Fla. 1962). See 1 NIcHOLs, EmmENT DomAiN § 1.42[2J n.9 (1950)
and cases therein cited.
27 See cases at notes 29 and 30 infra.
28 See cases at notes 32 and 33 infra.
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upholding five acre2 9 and aesthetic zoning ° are in point. It is
difficult to delineate the detriment or harm to the public interest
that is averted through a requirement that each lot in a residential
area must be a minimum of five acres or that the owner who plans
to build must get approval of exterior appearance from an architectural review board. Yet, such ordinances have been upheld as a
proper exercise of the police power.8 1 The standard that is often
applied relates to the extent of the regulation of the owner's use.
One court has stated the test to be whether the ordinance "permanently so restricts the use of property that it cannot be used
for any reasonable purpose. 832 If it does then it is viewed as a
3
taking which must be compensated for. 3
While the "no reasonable purpose" test looks to the extent of
the limitation upon the landowner's rights of use, the "detriment"

29

Fischer v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952).
Other cases have upheld minimum lot sizes of two acres: Dilliard v.
Village of North Hills, 276 App. Div. 969, 94 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1950); Levitt v.
Village of Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 189 N.Y.S.2d 212, 160 N.E.2d 501
(1959). Four-acre zoning was upheld in Senior v. Zoning Comm'n
of New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959). See Comment, 106
U. PA. L. REv. 292 (1957) and 1 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 34-35
(1962).
30 State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Co. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69
N.W.2d 217 (1955); Hayes v. Smith, 167 A.2d 546 (R.I. 1961). It is
true that most courts still say that zoning solely for aesthetic purposes is unconstitutional, but it is clear that this is a standard stated
but not really followed because the courts can usually find another valid
purpose for the ordinance. See Dukeminier, Zoning for Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955); POOLEY,
PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 84-90 (1961); CHAPIN,
URBAN LAND USE PLANNING 53-56 (1957); 1 RATHKOPF, ZONING AND
31

PLANNING ch. 11 (1962). See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
See cases at notes 29 and 30 supra.

32 Congressional

School of Aeronautics, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n 218 Md.
236, 242, 146 A.2d 558, 561 (1958).
33 A variation of the same approach states that an ordinance is not unconstitutional merely because the property may not be put to its most
profitable use. Guaclides v. Borough of Englewood Cliffs, 11 N.J. Super.
405, 78 A.2d 435 (App. Div. 1951); Zweifel MIfg. Corp. v. City of Peoria,
11 Ill. 2d 489, 144 N.E.2d 593 (1957); Scholneck v. City of Bloomfield
Hills, 350 Mich. 187, 86 N.W.2d 324 (1957). See 1 RATHKOPF, ZONING
AND PLANNING 6-6 nn.7 and 7a (1962) and 1 NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN

§ 1.42[10] (1950). In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
1922), Mr. Justice Holmes said: "Government hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law. As long recognized,
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test looks to the purpose or policy behind the ordinance and makes
a value judgment of the social utility of the proscribed use. Whether
the one test or the other should be applied to zoning is a most
challenging question which is for the most part academic, for
American courts have clearly made the choice. To retrace steps
now and provide for compensation in any case where a zoning
ordinance does not avoid a "detriment" to the public would mean
the practical end of much zoning in this country, unless the word
"detriment" were most loosely interpreted. With such a loose
interpretation, the result of applying the test would verge upon
that already reached by the courts using the "no reasonable purpose" approach. This latter formula, it is submitted, is a practical
compromise within the requirements of a workable zoning program.
How would this rule apply to the covenant abrogated by an
ordinance? It is obvious that such an ordinance may permanently
"restrict" the property right involved (represented by the covenant)
beyond any "reasonable purpose." In fact, where the ordinance
purports, for example, to allow industrial construction on property
covenanted residential only, it "restricts" the right out of existence.
Thus, it is suggested that if a city purports to completely abrogate
a covenant it must compensate the dominant tenant. This rule
would be in consonance with the cases holding that the dominant
tenant of a restrictive covenant must be compensated when the
government condemns the servient tenement. Indeed, it is an
anomaly that the rule should be different merely because in one
case the government condemns a servient interest and in the other
it does not.
The limits upon and the extent to which the eminent domain
device should be utilized in this area will be examined later in the
4
article.8
THE ULTRA VIRES PROBLEM
Lastly, court holdings that covenants prevail over ordinances
may rest upon the theory that the municipality has no power to
regulate in such a way as to affect private rights and private law-

some values . . .must yield to the police power. But obviously the
implied limitation must have its limits, or the contract and due process
clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits
is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a certain magnitude,
in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain
and compensation to sustain the act. So the question depends upon the
particular facts."
84See text accompanying notes 63-67 infra.
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matters traditionally for state legislatures and courts.3 5 There is
surprisingly scant case authority upon the question, but in isolated
instances such exercises of power have been upheld with little or
no discussion of the real issue. 36 The problem is of especial difficulty
where the municipality has the so-called power of home rule.3 7 In38
such instances, the municipality has at the least primary authority
and in some states plenary authority 39 over "local" or "municipal"
matters. In some jurisdictions the municipality even has power to
legislate on "state" matters where the legislature has not occupied
the field,40 though in other states, such municipalities have no power
to regulate matters of state concern, whether the legislature has
entered the area or not.41 The courts have not laid down a clear
differentiation as to what matters are local and what are state in
character but seem to make the determination on a case to case
basis.42 For example, it has been held in some states that regulation

35 On the broad question see FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 112 (1949);
FREUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION § 7 (1932); 6 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS § 22.01 (1949); ANTiEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW
§ 3.06 (1963); Comment, The Power of Ohio Municipalities to Enact
Private Law, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 152 (1948).
36
Raisch v. Myers, 27 Cal. 2d 773, 167 P.2d 198 (1946); Leis v. Cleveland
Ry., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73 (1920).
37 See McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 199 (1916); Schouler, Self-Rule in the
Cities, 20 YALE L.J. 463 (1911); Fordham & Asher, Home Rule Powers
in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 18 (1948).
38 City of Portland v. Welch, 154 Ore. 286, 59 P.2d 228 (1936); 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

§ 4.83 n.76 (1949) and cases therein

cited.
39 City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384, 10 P.2d 745 (1932); City of
Wewoka v. Rodman, 172 Okla. 630, 46 P.2d 334 (1935); 2 MCQuILLIN,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.83 (1949); 1 ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 3.14 (1963).
40 Consumers Coal Co. v. City of Lincoln, 109 Neb. 51, 189 N.W. 643 (1922);
Ex parte Galusha, 184, Cal. 697, 195 Pac. 406 (1921).
41 Green v. City of Amarillo, 244 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922); Van
Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25 (1936).
42See 2 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.85 (1949): "Decisions of
courts of last resort relating to this subject are more or less conflicting,
and even in the decisions of the same state there is this lack of harmony,
so that it is frequently difficult, and sometimes impossible, to determine
just where the power of the legislature to interfere stops and the right
of the city to be let alone begins." In Van Gilder v. City of Madison,
222 Wis. 58, 67, 267 N.W. 25, 28 (1936), the court said: "When is an
enactment of the Legislature of state-wide concern? We find no answer
to this question in any decision of any court in this country."
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of city streets is a matter of local concern 43 while in others it is
deemed a state matter. 44 There are cases saying that control of
municipal fire departments is of local 45 and others saying it is of
state concern. 46 The cases are split on the
power of municipal taxa48
tion47 and in many other areas as well.
The difficult question, then, is whether a state which allows
home rule cities to legislate in certain instances on matters of state
concern would permit property legislation which affects or changes
private law relationships. If it is held there is no such power, it
would be inconsistent with the above basic rule, assuming that
property law is a matter of state concern. And, a fortiori, if we
assume that it is a matter of local concern, where home rule cities
have exclusive jurisdiction. It would seem that when authorities,
court and text, state the rules about municipal power over lawmaking they are excepting, unconsciously, matters which are related
to traditional private law.
Professor Ernst Freund concluded this in his book, Legislative
Regulation.49 There he made the distinction between governmentlegislation and law-legislation, the former relating to the police
power, revenue, organization of government, and the public services,
and the latter including private law, criminal law, and procedure.
With respect to law-legislation it is universally assumed that the
municipality shall not have power, 50 and it is submitted that this
43

Massa v. City of Cincinnati, 51 Ohio Op. 101, 110 N.E.2d 726 (1953),
appeal dismissed, 160 Ohio St. 254, 115 N.E.2d 689 (1953); Salsbury v.
City of Lincoln, 117 Neb. 465, 220 N.W. 827 (1928); Civic Center Ass'n v.
Railroad Comm'n, 175 Cal. 441, 166 Pac. 351 (1917).
44
Pipoly v. Benson, 20 Cal. 2d 366, 125 P.2d 482 (1942).
45 Osborn v. Cohen, 272 N.Y. 55, 4 N.E.2d 289 (1936); City of Wewoka v.
Rodman, 172 Okla. 630, 46 P.2d 334 (1935).
46
Luhrs v. City of Phoenix, 52 Ariz. 483, 83 P.2d 283 (1938); Axberg v.
City of Lincoln, 141 Neb. 55, 2 N.W.2d 613 (1942).
47Local concern: West Coast Advertising Co. v. City & County of San
Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516, 95 P.2d 138 (1939); City of Ardmore v. Excise
Bd. of Carter County, 155 Okla. 126, 8 P.2d 2 (1932). State concern:
Haefner v. City of Youngstown, 147 Ohio St. 58, 68 N.E.2d 64 (1946).
48 See 2 McQUILIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIoNs §§ 4.89-.113 (3d ed. 1949).
49

FREUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION

§§

6-7 (1932).

50 "The enumeration [of powers] which is customary in charters or city
acts does not attempt systematic classification; but an analysis will show
that the subjects covered are always confined to police, revenue, organization, and public services or undertakings. There is never any thought
of including matter of private law .... " FREUND, LEGISLATIVE REGULATION § 7 (1932).
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tradition is one based in sound policy.51 Uniformity of private law
within a state certainly is a desideratum. Should the law of contracts vary from city to city within a state? Should a contract be
enforcible in New York and not in Albany? These questions seem
to answer themselves, at least with respect to those contracts to
which the city is not a party or in which the city does not have a
police power interest. Our federal system has shown the myriad
difficulties of having fifty separate private law making authorities.
To compound this to thousands would seem to be ridiculous.
Likewise, it seems clear that cities within a state should not
have different rules with respect to the formal requisites of passing
title to realty. Cities are not given home rule to handle matters
of this kind. In the final analysis, they are given local self government because theoretically they can run certain categories of their
affairs more efficiently and in a manner more responsive to local
52
will than can the state legislature.
If there is a possible dispute as to whether the handling of fire
departments and city streets is an appropriate matter for municipal
concern, surely there can be no doubt that a municipality has no
distinctly local interest in the law governing civil disputes between
private parties. So that even in a state in which the municipality
does have concurrent but subordinate jurisdiction over matters
of state concern, courts should strike down municipal attempts to
change private law. If this is so, is a municipal ordinance forbidding
a land use which is permitted by a covenant or permitting a land use
which is forbidden by a covenant an invalid attempt to change
private law? It is submitted that it should not be so regarded
because the change in private law relationships is only an incidental
effect of the exercise of the power to regulate land use. Thus, in
tort law, the municipality could not effectively legislate to declare
what shall subject a person to tort liability3 but state courts can
and do declare that, as a matter of state law, violation of a municipal
54
It
ordinance is negligence per se or is evidence of negligence.
is the state, then, through its courts that may declare which municipal ordinances shall be given private law effect and which

51 But see Comment, The Power of Ohio Municipalities to Enact Private
Law, 9 OBIO ST. L.J. 152 (1948).
52
See 1 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPoATIONS § 1.93 (3d ed. 1949) and note
37 supra.
53

See 6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 22.01 (3d ed. 1949) and
cases therein cited.
at §§ 22.02-.04.

54 Id.

ORDINANCES AND COVENANTS

shall not. The question, thus; is whether courts should, as a matter
of policy, apply ordinances to abrogate covenants. The analogy
to the doctrines of negligence per se is not perfect. The latter
incorporates a municipal standard of care into state law. It might
be argued that giving covenant-abrogating effect to zoning ordinances would be a much more drastic "delegation" of private law
making to the city, because the ordinance could restrict an owner
in the accustomed use of his property. But, is this really true?
Even without an inconsistent covenant, courts, legislatures, and
municipalities themselves have refused to impose the effect of
zoning ordinances upon a prior nonconforming use. 5 So the pure
problem of covenant versus ordinance would arise only where the
actual prior use is not purportedly eliminated by the covenant. For
example, assume a present use for industry, a restrictive covenant
against use other than for industry purposes and a subsequent
zoning ordinance requiring residential use. In such a situation, the
fact that there is a covenant present is almost irrelevant to a determination of whether the ordinance is valid because of the rule that
prior nonconforming uses shall not be eliminated by zoning ordinances. But change the facts and assume the land is idle at the
time of the enactment of the ordinance and the problem of which
land use control governs is of paramount significance.
Therefore, the legal effect of the ordinance would be prospective in the sense that it would not prevent an already established
use. Even so, it can be argued that giving it that much effect is too
much an abdication by the state to municipal control. The satisfactory answer to that argument is that we have entrusted land
use control to the cities and to fully effectuate that control, state
courts as a matter of policy should, in appropriate circumstances,
give legal effect to ordinances which conflict with covenants.
Does that mean that all subsequent ordinances should as a
matter of law be deemed controlling over prior covenants? To
what extent should compensation be required? To answer these
questions, it is appropriate to deal with several hypothetical cases
where the conflicting interests and policies will more readily appear.
ZONING ORDINANCES PRIOR IN TIME
CASE I

-ORDINANCE

MORE RESmICrIVE

Blackacre is zoned residential. Subsequent to enactment of the
ordinance, A, owner of Blackacre, sells it to B with a restrictive

55 8 McQuiLLN, MumncIPAL CoRPORATIONS §§ 25.180-.212 (3d ed. 1949).
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covenant saying that Blackacre may be used for any purpose other
than as a slaughterhouse. B goes into possession and plans to construct a light industrial plant. The city refuses to issue a building
permit for such construction. B sues to compel issuance of the
permit.
This case presents one of the simpler problems. It is perfectly
clear that B is bound by the prior ordinance and takes subject to
its provisions. No one would argue that the parties could rid themselves of the ordinance by a contract. Such a position would mean
that all zoning ordinances could be eliminated by the simple expedient of transferring property with a covenant inconsistent with
the unwanted ordinance. This would be the effective end of municipal land use planning.
CASE II- ORDINANCES AND COVENANT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
Greenacre is zoned for light industrial uses only, under a noncumulative zoning ordinance. 50 Subsequent to enactment of the
ordinance, C, owner of Greenacre, sells it to D with a restrictive
covenant saying that Greenacre may be used for residence purposes
only. D seeks a building permit for construction of a one-family
residence which is refused by the municipal officer. D sues to
compel issuance of the permit.
This case is somewhat analogous to Case I in that there is an
absolute inconsistency between the covenanted use and the mandate
of the ordinance. The difference is that in Case I there were possible uses of the property which would not violate either the ordinance or the covenant. In this case there is no conceivable use that
would not violate one or the other. There i§ thus presented the
clearest clash between the two instrumentalities of control, public

56 A noncumulative or single-use zoning ordinance is one which excludes
all other uses from the zone. The cumulative ordinance is, of course,
one that sets up zones of "higher" to "lower" uses (residence being
higher than commercial and commercial being higher than industrial)
and permits the higher use in areas zoned for the lower uses but not
the reverse. Thus under a cumulative zoning ordinance, residential use
would be permitted in an area zoned industrial, but industrial use would
not be permitted in an area zoned residential. Historically in the United
States, zoning ordinances have been cumulative.

A recent tendency

toward noncumulative ordinances has been noted. Such ordinances
generally exclude residential uses from areas zoned industrial. See
WEBSTER, URBAN PLANNING AND MUNICIPAL PUBLIC PoLIcY 384-87 (1958);

Madsen, Noncumulative Zoning in Illinois, 37 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 108
(1960); 52 MICH. L. REV. 925 (1954); Comment, Industrial Zoning to Exclude Higher Uses, 32 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1261 (1957); Note, Non-Cumulative
Zoning Ordinance Upheld, 20 OHIO ST. L.J. 708 (1959).
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and private. But the result should be controlled by the reasoning
of Case I. Since when D bought, he knew or should have known
of the fact that Greenacre is zoned for industrial use, he should
be deemed to be bound by this knowledge. Again, if one wanted
to evade the mandate of an ordinance which allowed no use but
industrial, this would be an easy way to do so. The seller could be
instructed to insert a restrictive covenant against nonresidential
construction and the ordinance could be circumvented. It is for
these reasons that the ordinance ought to control no matter what
the subsequent restrictive covenant purports to do.
CASE III

-ORDINANCE

LESS RESTRICTIVE

Whiteacre is zoned for light industrial use which includes all
"higher" uses such as residential. 57 Subsequent to enactment of the
ordinance, E, owner of Whitacre sells it to F with a restrictive
covenant saying that Whiteacre may be used for residential purposes only. F goes into possession and plans to construct a light
industrial plant. E, who retained property adjacent to Whiteacre,
seeks an injunction to restrain F from breaching his covenant.
In this case, F's argument would be that the zoning ordinance
represents the public mandate as to the type of land uses which are
appropriate to the area, and, therefore, the ordinance should control,
else landowners could repeal ordinances at will. E could reply that
one of our societal values is the maximization of individual decision.5 8 Here, the parties may contract with respect to the use of
land, as the contracted use is not inconsistent with the uses permitted by the ordinance but is merely more restrictive. F's rejoinder would be that the law does not give parties untrammeled
rights to contract with respect to the law (witness the rules against
contracting away liability for negligence). Here the public will is
affirmative that industrial as well as residential uses shall be permitted, and this public will should not be frustrated unless it is
desired to take completely from the government the power to regulate the use of land.
E might say in reply that the public mandate is an important
value that must be protected but not at the expense of allowing
F to breach his contractual obligation personally entered into. Therefore, the argument goes, E should be allowed to enforce the covenant
at least against F, the original party to the covenant, though argu-

See note 56 supra.
58 See MCDOUGAL & HABER,
57

PROPERTY, WEALTH,

NING AND DEVELOPMENT 1-28, 113-17 (1948).

LAND: ALLOCATION, PLAN-

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 43, NO. 3
ably the law might refuse to enforce it against a purchaser from F.
In other words, the law might refuse to allow the burden of the
inconsistent covenant to run with the land. Such an approach has
been suggested in another connection, 59 and it has the virtue of
being a compromise between the two basic contending values: the
freedom of individual action versus the power of the state to control
a limited resource. It is suggested, however, that this is not an
appropriate solution. Cities have been given power over land use
for the strongest reasons of policy, and if the city deems it appropriate to permit a certain land use, private parties should not have
the power subsequently to forbid it. This, of course, is not to say
that a city can force an owner to use his land for the zoned purpose.
The owner can always leave his land idle. But on the other hand,
the covenantee should not be able to enjoin a use specifically permitted by the city, if the city truly desires to have more than one
use in the zoned area. Historically, zoning has been cumulative,
i.e., each less restricted zone contains all "higher" uses. In practice,
however, each zone tended to contain primarily the "lowest" use.
In modern city planning theory, multiple uses within an area are
deemed to present important values to the entire community.0°
59

"The point of difficulty comes with respect to those agreements which
needlessly impede the liquidity of land or interfere with its most rational use and development, but which because of the community's traditional preference for honoring private volition are held enforceable
between the original parties. It is superficially plausible to argue that
if an agreement is enforceable as between the original parties, if no
policy outlaws it with respect to them, it should be equally enforceable
against third parties, assuming all formalities and procedures to have
been complied with, since as indicated above, little reason appears why
the personality of any particular record title owner should make any
difference to the parties' reasonable expectations. A more pragmatic
approach would appear to suggest, however, that even though it may be
impossible to persuade the courts to withdraw their protection for these
agreements as between the immediate parties, and to impose limits
beyond crime and immorality as between promisor and promisee, it may
still be advisable, as the next best step, to urge them to withdraw protection from such agreements against third parties. The refusal by
courts to extend protection to such agreements against third parties
would of course be a great deterrent to their making." McDOUGAL &
HABER, PROPERTY, WEALTH, LAND: ALLOCATION, PLANNING AND DEVELOP-

MENT 596 (1948).
60 Among these could be listed reduction in crime and juvenile delinquency,
increase in the cultural values of the community, ridding the city dweller
of his anonymity and increasing neighborhood civic responsibility. The
outstanding theoretician espousing these views is Jane Jacobs. See
JACOBs, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES ch. 8 (1961);
WHEN DEMOCRACY BUILDS 66, 67 (1945); Crompton, Layout, 32
TOWN PLANNING REVIEW 213 (1961).
WRIGHT,
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These values the city should be able to attain through its zoning
laws. With this in mind, it is submitted that the court should refuse enforcement of the covenant by damages or injunction in this
type of case where it is manifest that the city planners intend the
zoned area to contain mixed uses. Of course, judicial ascertainment
of the planner's state of mind poses some practical problems, but
it seems they would be no more difficult than any other task of
interpretation. 61 On the other hand, if it is found that there is no
intent to have mixed uses in the area, there would be no reason not
to enforce the covenant as in any other case.
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS PRIOR IN TIME
CASE IV -

ODINANCE LESS RESTRICTIVE OR ORDINANCE AND COVENA

MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
G, owner of a large subdivision which he plans to develop for
residence purposes, conveys a parcel thereof to H with a covenant
that H, his heirs and assigns shall use the property for residence
purposes only. Subsequently, the city enacts an ordinance zoning
the parcel within a light industrial area which includes residences.
H, after obtaining a building permit, proceeds to construct a building for the manufacture of pharmaceuticals. G sues H to enjoin
the construction as a violation of the covenant. H defends that
the subsequent ordinance abrogated the covenant.
As noted above, almost all of the case law that has been handed
down has involved circumstances similar to these: i.e., a prior
covenant more restrictive than a subsequent zoning ordinance, and
the courts have been almost unanimous in holding the covenant to
control. 62 It is submitted that the courts are, in a sense, right but
for the wrong reason. As shown above, there is only one constitutional ground upon which the courts could and should rest: i.e.,
that property may not be taken for a public purpose without payment of compensation. Here it is apparent that the entire value
of the covenant has been destroyed, that it has no reasonable purpose left, and that, therefore, compensation would be mandatory. A
court, then, would be correct in ruling such an ordinance, as in this
case, to be an unconstitutional taking. Thus, the ordinance would
not be a defense for H in a suit by G. But suppose that with statutory authority the ordinance provided for compensation to all in-

61 In general, it would be best if the zoning ordinance itself specifically
provided whether mixed uses were an affirmative goal.
62 See cases at notes 5-9 supra.
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jured dominant tenants owning restrictive covenants covering lands
within the zoned area. G's interest would cease, since it would have
been lawfully taken by the state for a fair compensation. H with
impunity could breach the covenant. The rules would obviously
be the same where the covenant and ordinance are mutually exclusive as it is apparent that in such case the covenant would be
xompletely abrogated if the mandate of the ordinance is obeyed.
The use of the eminent domain device poses a myriad of theoretical problems in timing, measurement of damages and assessment
of costs and benefits. A discussion of many of these problems is
necessary for an understanding of the ramifications of the proposed
solution.
Timing of and Conditions Precedent For Compensation
The first question that obviously presents itself is upon what
event would the obligation to compensate become fixed? 63 There
are two possible views: first, that compensation should be made
when the ordinance is passed; second, that compensation should
be made when someone violates the covenant to the detriment of
the dominant tenant. For the former view, it may be argued that
the moment the ordinance is passed such ordinance may have the
effect of lowering the value of the dominant property no longer
protected by the covenant, and that this is a "taking" within the
meaning of the Constitution which must be compensated for. The
argument for the other view would be that until the covenant is
actually violated, there is no loss and further, until one knows
exactly what the violation will be, there is no way to measure
the diminution in value. In answer to this, it might be said that
there is a most plausible way to make an immediate measurement,
i.e., to take the difference in market values of the dominant property before and after passage of the ordinance. 64 It may be in some
cases there will be no difference. But, if the property is less desirable because it is no longer protected by a covenant, its value will
be discounted through market forces by an amount equal to the

6See generally 3
64

NiCHOLs,

EMINENT DomAin

§ 8.5 (1950).

But see 4 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.321 (1962). It is there argued

that the covenantee should receive the amount of the diminution in
value of the servient estate caused by the existence of the covenant on
the theory that compensation is awarded for the land itself and not for
the sum of the different interests in the land. See also 4 NicHOLS, Op. Cit.
supra note 64, at §§ 12.3151, 12.36[1]. Cf. Herr v. Board of Educ., 82
N.J.L. 610, 83 Atl. 173 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912).
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market assessment of the probability and extent of violation. Therefore, payment can and should be made immediately. Of course, if
the removal of the covenant either enhances or does not affect the
value of the dominant property no payment would be made.
Assessment of Social Costs and Benefits
Let us examine the alternatives as to how the social costs and
values arising out of the ordinance can be assessed. In the hypothetical, assume that G, the owner of the dominant tenement is the
only dominant tenant, that there are several score of servient
tenements whose properties are being enhanced in value a total of
one million dollars by shedding the burden of the restrictive
covenants, and that the value of the dominant tenement is decreased
a total of one million dollars by the loss of the covenants in its
favor. There are theoretically two possible ways of assessing the
costs. First, we can say that the government, after paying G one
million dollars as a condemnation award, should assess the servient
tenements one million dollars for the benefits they have reaped
from the condemnation. 65 The second alternative is to allow the
government to bear the cost while the servient tenants receive
gratis, an increase in value. The argument for the first alternative
is that when the servient tenants bought the land, they bought
subject to the covenants. It is thus inequitable for them to gain
the advantage of having the covenant lifted by governmental action
and have society bear the cost of their special advantage.
There are several arguments in answer. First, it is true that
the servient tenants are getting a "windfall" advantage from the

65 This approach, though not utilized in the United States, was a part of
English law for 100 years. The English attempted to collect "betterment" from those who benefited from governmental land activities. The
theory was that the government would compensate those whose land was
taken and this amount would be balanced by collections from neighbors
whose land values went up as a result of the improvement. The experiments in collection of betterment were a failure and were substantially abandoned in the Town and Country Planning Act of 1954,
2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 72. See REPORT OF THE EXPERT CoMnvIITTEE ON ComPENSATION AND BETTEMVENT (The Uthwatt Report 1942); POOLEY, THE
EvoLUTIoN OF BRTISH PLANNING LEGISLATION 17-25, 82-86, 91-92 (1960);
HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 545-56 (1959); Haar, PlanningLaw, 32 TOWN
PLANNING REvIEw 95, 106-14 (1961); Mandelker, Notes from the English:
Compensation in Town and Country Planning, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 698
(1961); Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58
COLum. L. REV. 650, 663-69 (1958). Cf. Bishop &Phelps, Enhancement in
Condemnation Cases, 13 ALA. L. REV. 122 (1960); Note, 21 U. PITT. L.
REV. 60 (1959).
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condemnation, but this is also true in any condemnation proceeding. There is always some abutting or nearby landowner who
benefits by a new highway. At present we do not assess such
people. Where the method has been tried, it has been found cumbersome and unworkable. 6 Second, it is unfair to emphasize the special
advantage that accrues to the servient owner. Society, by hypothesis, benefits from removal of the covenant, else the municipality
would not seek its abrogation. Again, if society is to charge people
specially benefiting from the exercise of its activities, it would seem
logically to follow that it should confiscate all other windfall receipts and unearned income such as the fortuitous discovery of oil
upon property. This the government has not done and should not
do. One other factor might be mentioned; i.e., it would seem unfair
for an assessment to be charged against a servient tenement "benefited" by a release from the burdens of the covenant when the
owner of the tenement does not desire to sell or utilize it in its
more "valuable" use. He would in effect be paying for a benefit
he never receives. It is submitted, therefore, that these arguments
and the British experience 67 point to a continuance of present rules.
Society should bear the cost of abrogating the benefits of a covenant.
The ReciprocalCovenant Situation
In the most common situation, the covenantors and covenantees
are not separate groups. Rather, there is a large subdivision in
which each owner is both a covenantor and covenantee; i.e., each
may enforce the covenant against a violating neighbor and each
neighbor may enforce it against him. In such circumstance, the
problems of compensation are less complex, because there are no
separate groups of those who benefit and those who lose. It is probable that each owner would gain or lose approx imately as much as
his neighbor. In such a case compensation, if any, would be based
again upon the total loss in value resulting from the removal of both
the benefit and burden of the covenant.

60The arguments against collection of betterment are stated in POOLEY, THE
EVOLUTION OF BRITISH PLANNING LEGISLATION 17, 22 (1960) and may be
summarized as follows:
1. The idea is clearly at variance with other common law principles of
quasi-contract.
2. There is no effective way of collecting betterment. Attempts in
England were never successful.
3. Political repercussions were constant when attempts to collect were
made.
4. Floating or potential betterment is, as a practical matter, uncollectible.
67 See note 66 supra.
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CASE V-PRIOR COVENANT WrrH SUBSEQUENT MORE RESTRICTIVE

ORDINANCE
J, owner of a large subdivision which he plans to develop for
low cost single family dwellings, conveys a parcel thereof to K with
a covenant that K shall use the property only for single family
dwelling purposes. Subsequently, the city zones the subdivision
in a residential area, where one-family houses of 2,000 square feet
or greater may be constructed. When the city denies K's application for a building permit to construct a home of 1,000 square feet,

K brings suit to compel issuance of the permit and for a declaratory
judgment that the ordinance is unconstitutional as applied to him.
J joins as a party plaintiff.
Again, the only possible constitutional ground which J and K
might successfully argue is that they are entitled to compensation
for the loss they sustained from the abrogation of the covenant.
The question resolves itself to whether the ordinance so restricts
the property right (the covenant) as to render it useless for any
reasonable purpose. 68 If it does, compensation ought constitutionally
be required: If it-ddesnot; then it ought to be upheld as a reasonable exercise of the police power. In this case, the covenant is not
rendered nugatory by the ordinance, because the ordinance does
not purport to authorize that which the covenant prohibits, but
rather permits in more limited fashion that which the covenant
allows. The property right then is not "taken" in a constitutional
sense, as there is no attempt to abrogate it.
On the other hand, the landowners might argue that substantially all their interest in the covenant has been negated by a
provision severely narrowing its scope, that in fact the subdivision
was planned to contain the very types of housing the ordinance
proscribes, and, therefore, the benefits of the covenant have been
"taken" by the ordinance. In answer, it might be said that it is not
their interest in the covenant but their interest in the unfettered
use of their land that is affected by the ordinance. The covenant
does not purport to allow large residences but to forbid nonresidential construction. And this stricture the ordinance does not
attempt to overrule. Hence, it would appear that when the subsequent ordinance is more restrictive, it would constitute a valid
exercise of the police power and no compensation would be necessary.

6

SSee text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.

470

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 43, NO. 3

CONCLUSION
Conflicts between zoning ordinances and restrictive covenants
pose difficult problems for the courts not well solved by the present
simple formula that a covenant cannot be abrogated by an ordinance. The law should give greater recognition of society's interest in the rational use of land by giving greater effect to society's
chief means of regulation, the zoning ordinance. There is no constitutional barrier to allowing ordinances to prevail over covenants
except for the requirement that property shall not be taken for
public use without payment of compensation. This provision applies only when the ordinance is subsequent in time to the covenant
and the ordinance is less restrictive or mutually exclusive to the
covenant. When the ordinance is subsequent in time and more
restrictive no compensation is necessary. On the other hand, when
the ordinance is prior in time it should govern as against subsequent less restrictive or mutually exclusive covenants. When a
prior ordinance is less restrictive than a subsequent covenant, the
ordinance should govern where it is manifest that the city intends
that the zoned area should have a broad spectrum of uses.

